1. the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the subjectand the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision to allow the subject to accept these risks;
2. the rights and welfare of any such subjects will be adequately protected;
3. legally effective informed consent will be obtained by adequate and appropriate methods; and 4. the conduct of the activity will be reviewed at timely intervals.
Special provisions are established for "vulnerables": children, the mentally infrrm, the terminally ill, the comatose, etc. Parents or guardians or special advocates must give permission, after insuring that the subject's interests are well protected. Three philosophical principles 2 undergird the guidelines:
• the principle of respect • the principle of beneficence • the principle of justice The overall principle is: No human is to participate in an experiment unless there is assurance the subject of the experiment will not be harmed-physically, psychologically. or socially, and unless the subject gives informed consent. The scientific community has accepted this principle. The application of these guidelines is in no way anti-scientific. Scientists do not regard the protection of human subjects in experiments to be inconsistent with academic freedom.
in Los Angeles in 1980. I was on the speakers' platfonn at that demonstration. Sperling discusses the 1983 demonstrations at three major Primate Research Centers organized by Mobilization for Animals. I was on the speakers' platform at the Primate Research Center at the University of Wisconsin. Sperling discusses maternal separation experiments on Iangur monkeys. At the University of Wisconsin I was in public debate with psychologist Professor Steven Suomi, who worked with, and co-published with, Harry Harlow on maternal deprivation experiments on rhesus macaque monkeys. I have debated with scientists at the University of Minnesota and North Dakota State University. I spoke at a demonstration at the University of California San Diego Medical School. I served several years on the board of directors of the International Society for Animal Rights. I taught an Animal Rights course at Moorhead State University in Minnesota eight years. Each time, my class was visited by the Chair of the Biology Department, by the Chair of the Psychology Department, and by a representative of the Minnesota Farm Bureau.
I have a deep respect for science. In graduate studies at the University of Minnesota I studied philosophy of science with philosophers of international reputation. I have taught philosophy of science. My life style is based on an attempt to get off the backs of animals to the greatest extent possible. So naturally, I looked forward to learning how a cultural anthropologist would view us animal rights activists.
Let me list some characteri7.ations of us activists, and of the animal rights movement, as viewed by Sperling. Sperling uses the terms "animal liberators" and "animal rights activists" interchangeably. Sperling says, in effect I. Your animal rights movement is similar to a charismatic cult (pp. 19, 194);
2. The concept of the millenium (suggestive of millenarian sects and cults in Medieval times) is an important theme in your animal rights ideology (pp. 17, 194, . (Sperling always uses the term "ideology" in referring to thought-patterns in the animal rights movement. She does not define "ideology." One meaning of "ideology" has the connotation of intentional propagandizing or distortion of facts. She never uses the term "ideology" when discussing the thought-patterns of the lobby groups promoting animal experimen- • To convince the public that animal rightists are anti-science.
• To isolate the animal rights group from the general public.
The A.M.A. would be delighted with Sperling's characterization of us: anti-science culL Let me try to formulate the basic argument structuring Sperling's view. Apparently, cultural anthropology finds it important to study the symbolic. roles of animals. Given that other sciences such as zoology, biology, ethology and psychology study the nature of animals, in and of themselves, it seems to be a fruitful study for anthropologists to study the human use of animals as representations of something else. This symbolic role of animals is prominent in what I take to be Sperling's basic argument:
Interpretation ofSperling's Argu1tU!nt None of the statements in this argument reflect the essential nature of the animal rights movement. This analysis is wrong-headed. Why so? I will provide seven criticisms of Sperling's analysis, the frrst six mainly methodological, and the seventh-the most important more philosophical. 
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I will consider six major themes in the animal rights literature:
1. We humans are harming the animals.
By the word "we" in this sentence, I mean we as a society, a society which institutionalizes the harming of animals. For example, although you and I are not now harmfully experimenting on an animal, we nevertheless are participating in animal experimentation by financing experiments through payment of taxes.
Likewise, we are participating in the use of intensive factory farms in the raising of animals and poultry for food; we pay taxes to support land-grant universities which develop factory farming techniques.
Animal rightists are concerned about all types of harm to animals: in trapping, in hunting, in zoos, in animal experiments and testing, in rodeos, in circuses, in films, in raising and slaughtering animals for food, etc.
Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation, provides a detailed factual account of the various ways animals are harmed in animal laboratories and experiments and testing. Likewise, he gives an extensive factual description of how animals are harmed in intensive factory farming methods. Most readers of Animal Liberation are shocked to learn what is happening to animals. Sperling finds that readers of Singer's Animal Liberation experience something like a revelation. Sperling to the contrary, this is not something like a religious-cultish revelation; it is a/actual revelation. My students in animal rights classes were stunned to learn what is happening to animals.
There are many ways in which we can harm animals:
la. To destroy the natural habitat of an animal is to harm that animal.
Obviously, the very existence of an animal depends on its environment. This type of harm reveals the intimate connection between the animal rights movement and environmental and ecological movements.
lb. To remove an animal from its natural habitat is to harm that animal.
Removal from natural habitat results in extreme distress and terror, also in the disruption of psychological and social relations with other members of the species.
Ie. To eause pain or distress or suffering or misery or terror in an animal, unless to
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benefit that animal, is to harm that animal.
As for humans, there are situations where suffering is necessary for ultimate benefit.
If I terrify a deer with a firecracker to scare it out of the hunter's range, the terror in this sense leads to the benefit of the deer.
Id. To mutilate an animal, unless to benefit that animal, is to harm the animal.
It is rather obvious that the removal of an animal's leg is not normally in that animal's interest. But if the leg is gangrenous, amputation may well benefit it.
Ie. To kill an animal, unless to benefit that animal, is to harm the animal.
Some people seem to believe that if an animal be instantaneously killed, without any suffering, without any apprehension of being killed, the animal is not hanned. We surely do not think this when humans are killed instantaneously without suffering. Animal rightists regard killing as the ultimate harm, since it makes life impossible. There are cases where killing an animal is for its benefit; for example, when a deer is so severely mutilated when struck by a truck that it benefits the animal to be put out of its misery.
2. The harming of an animal needs moral justification.
We certainly believe that the harming of a human requires moral justification. Likewise, the harming of an animal needs moral justification.
3. The burden of providing a moral justification is on the person who harms an animal.
It is not the responsibility of the animal rightist to demonstrate that the harming of an animal is wrong. It is the responsibility of the harmer to demonstrate that the harming of an animal is not wrong.
Since Sperling analyzed the animal rights movement in tenns of animal experimentation, let us take a look at typical attempts to justify harmful experiments on animals. Let me create a dialogue between the animal experimenter and the animal rightist Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experiments are justified because we humans are rational and animals are not rational."
Animal Rightist: "Some animals are more rational than some humans. Chimpanzees are more rational than newly born human infants, and more rational than some severely retarded humans. Using this justification, you should experiment on some humans before experimenting on some animals. 1be use of rationality as a criterion is arbitrary. This kind of reasoning will lead you to the conclusion that it is much less objectionable to club a dull janitor than to club a smart college professor."
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experimen tation is justified because such experiments will give us knowledge about humans, which we can use to benefit us humans." Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experimen tation is justified because it will give us knowledge, and any kind of knowledge is good in and of itself, whether it helps humans or not."
Animal Rightist: "By that reasoning you must also conclude that experimenting on humans will give us knowledge, whether it helps humans or not."
The animal rights literature is rich in critical analyses of claimed justifications for harming animals-in all contexts, not only in animal experimentation. Animal rightists have come to the conclusion that no attempted justification will prove satisfactory and that we should radically change our views on, and treatment of, animals.
4. We have a duty not to harm the animals. Let's take a brief look at how Peter Singer would interpret this claim. Peter Singer's theoretical framework is utilitarianism. According to utilitarianism the goal ofall our actions and social policies should be to maximize the totality of pleasure-and-happiness and to minimize the totality of pain-and-suffering. Singer argues that equal pains and equal pleasures should be given equal consideration, regardless of species membership. Agiven quantity of pain or suffering in a horse should receive equal consideration, morally, as the same quantity of pain or suffering in George Bush. This is what Singer means when he refers to the moral equality of humans and animals. Anyone who denies the moral equality of humans and animals in this sense is regarded as a speciesist, analogous to sexism and racism. Apparently Singer would characterize Dr. Sperling as a speciesist. In the preface to her book she states "An education in evolution has left me with a strong conviction of human uniqueness, and I cannot view animals as moral equals." (p. xi) Sperling seems to be arguing that animals are not morally equal to Fall 1990 humans because humans are unique. This is a very weak argument. One could just as welI argue that humans are not morally equal to rats because rats are unique. Perhaps I do not understand what a species is. I am under the impression that an species are unique.
In his Animal Liberation Peter Singer argues that the totality ofpain-and-suffering would be minimized, and the totality of pleasure-and-happiness would be maximized, by folIowing a social policy of phasing out harmful animal experimentation and phasing out the use of animals for food.
Not alI philosophers are in complete agreement with Peter Singer's theoretical framework. IfI correctly understand Steve Sapontzis' theory, he argues for our duty not to harm animals on a somewhat expanded basis. I5 His basic approach is that animal liberation can be based on three fundamental principles already well accepted in our moral tradition: o We should be fair. o We should minimize suffering and maximize happiness.
o We should develop moral character.
The application of these three principles will result in a close approximation to vegetarianism, with the conclusion that experiments on animals should be governed by the same moral principles which govern human experiments.
5. The animals have a right not to be harmed by us. Some philosophers use rights language and argue that a rights view is stilI stronger than a duty view as expressed in (4) above. Tom Regan, North Carolina State University, is the most prominent theorist arguing for anima1 rights in a technical sense. I6 Using principles of justice and equality, Regan develops a theory of moral rights for humans and animals, based on the equal inherent value of individuals which have experiences, individuals which are subjects of a life, individuals whose lives can become better or worse for them. Regan emphasizes the right not to be harmed, arguing the infliction of death to be the ultimate harm. Regan concludes: vegetarianism is morally obligatory; hunting and trapping are morally wrong; and harmful experiments and tests on animals should cease.
6. Therefore, we should stop harming animals. This final conclusion reveals the revolutionary nature of the animal rights movement. This is not an absolute claim; it is a prima facie obligation which
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211 holds except in extraordinary situations. The prima facie principle we should not harm humans generally applies; but the right of self-defense may justify exceptions. Similarly, our obligation not to harm animals may sometimes be weaker than our right to defend ourselves against threatened or actual harm by animals. Sperling, in herAnimal Liberators, ignores the revolutionary nature of the animal rights movement. Traditionally, animals have been regarded as resources to serve human interests. This tradition has one imperative: when harming animals to serve human interests do not cause U1UIecessary harm. That is, do not cause the animal any more harm than is required to serve the human interest. On the contrary, the animal rights movement sttesses the revolutionary imperative:
Do not harm animals. Period. Animals are not resources for human manipulation. The same basic moral principles apply to humans and animals.
Experiments on animals should be governed by the same ethical guidelines as those applying to experiments on humans. The same Institutional Review Board should be the approving agency for both human experiments and animal experiments. Risks (physical, psychological and social) to the animal should be carefulIy analyzed. The interests and the well being of the animal should be protected. Informed consent should be obtained. Three underlying ethical principles should be folIowed: the respect principle, the beneficence principle, and the justice principle.
Someone may object: "But animals cannot give infonned consent!" What foIlows from this objection? The conclusion that we can therefore experiment on animals? From the fact that human infants cannot give infonned consent it does not follow that we are free to experiment on them. Animals have some ability to express their willingness or unwillingness to participate in experimentsP Their body language is communi cative. They can "vote with their feet." To the extent that animals cannot express consent or dissent, guardians or special advocates should be appointed to protect the animals' interests. Animals should be classified as "vulnerables," as are human infants and the severely retarded.
Animal rightists are not anti-science. Animal rightists are against harming animals in all contexts. The application of ethical guidelines to animal experiments is no more anti-science than the application of the same guidelines to human experiments.
